The Cold War is often depicted as a bilateral conflict between the USSR and the US and their respective allies. Therefore, the relations between these two superpowers and their allies are often overlooked. This is especially true in the case of Sino-Soviet relations, as even today, they are collectively viewed as rivals by the West. However, the relationship between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union became incredibly strained during the latter half of the Cold War. We will therefore examine the origins of the rift between the PRC and the USSR, its impacts, and how it was ultimately bridged.  

Following the victory of the communists in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the relations between the PRC and the USSR were cordial. This was illustrated by the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance in 1950, which further improved relations between the two countries politically, economically, and militarily. Specifically, Moscow loaned China $300 million, provided military aid in the case of another Japanese invasion, and returned the Chinese Eastern Railway, Port Arthur, and Dalian. The USSR also supported the First Five Year Plan between 1953 and 1957, which saw Chinese steel production quadruple.

However, there was already ideological conflict between the two countries at this point. Essentially, traditional Marxist theory stipulated that communist revolution would be led by an urbanised working class, but Mao Zedong believed that revolution could also be led by a peasant working class. Mao, however, accepted Stalin as the leader of the communist world, hence the ideological difference was less pronounced.

When Stalin died, Khrushchev implemented a series of liberalising reforms following his Secret Speech of 1956, which denounced Stalin’s initial military incompetency, irresponsible use of power, and cult of personality. The reforms, also known as the ‘Khrushchev Thaw’, saw the relaxation of censorship and release of political prisoners. The PRC mirrored these reforms with the Hundred Flowers Campaign of 1956, which similarly experimented with more freedom of expression. However, the campaign resulted in a dramatic failure, as the government was inundated with millions of letters that voiced their criticisms of the government. The results worried the central government, as it had been expected that most of the Chinese people had embraced communism. Additionally, Mao felt threatened by events like the Hungarian Uprising in 1956 that were a culmination of these experimental reforms. As a result, the Anti-Rightist Movement was implemented by the PRC, leading to the persecution of over 500,000 ‘rightists’, which were mainly intellectuals, students, and artists who had expressed criticism over the government and its policies. Meanwhile, these very ‘rightists’ were being freed from prisons in the Soviet Union, which displayed the increasing ideological rift between the two nations.

Along with liberalisation came the USSR’s new position on foreign affairs. Khrushchev’s new stance of seeking peaceful coexistence with the West was viewed by Beijing as a betrayal of the communist cause. Mao, on the other hand, was bolder in propagating communism, and even embraced the idea of a war to do so. Therefore, Khrushchev feared that Mao would be overly enthusiastic about using nuclear weapons, so the USSR ceased funding the Chinese nuclear program. Khrushchev’s concerns were well founded: that same year, Mao attempted to invade Taiwan, where the Republic of China escaped after 1949. Fearing that the USSR would be drawn into another global war, Khrushchev encouraged Mao to call off the attack, but he was largely ignored, and the invasion was only called off after China realised the war could not be won.

The straw that broke the camel’s back came during the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962. Instead of supporting its communist ally China, the Soviet Union instead supported India by exporting advanced MiG-21 fighter jets to them. In protest, Beijing broke off diplomatic relations with Moscow later that year; the unprecedented rift was now official.

The consequences of the Sino-Soviet split for the entire world were immense: the Cold War was no longer bipolar, but tripolar. This meant that the Soviets and the Chinese could have gone to war against each other, thus by 1968 the USSR stationed 16 divisions, 200 aeroplanes, and 120 medium-range missiles along their border with China. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there were multiple border disputes between the USSR and the PRC that even escalated into firefights in 1969. One example of this was the Battle of Zhenbao Island, in Northeast China, which led to 32-58 Soviet casualties and 29-248 Chinese casualties.

There was also cooperation between the USA and the USSR, and the USA and the PRC. In the early 1960s, Washington feared that a ‘nuclear China’ would shift the balance of power to the communist world, therefore the US tried to impede the Chinese nuclear program through several ways, one of which was to initiate a pre-emptive attack on the PRC by both the US and USSR. Although Moscow refused initially, in 1969 the Soviets planned to make a pre-emptive atomic bomb attack on China and asked the USA to remain neutral. However, at this point Washington viewed the USSR as the greater threat, thus refused and warned that such an attack would risk another world war.

At the same time, Beijing decided that it could not fight both the USSR and the USA simultaneously, hence sought a rapprochement with Washington. This came in the form of Henry Kissinger’s and subsequently President Nixon’s visits in the early 70s, which offended the USSR. This led the USSR to station double the size of the garrisons along the Chinese border by 1973 compared to 1969. The other impact of China’s strengthening relationship with the US was that this facilitated future liberalising reforms.

The Sino-Soviet split began to be repaired following Mao’s death in 1976, because his successor, Deng Xiaoping, initiated an era of political moderation and economic reform. Deng’s administration was notably less concerned with the previous abstract ideological diatribe. The split is usually recognised as having ended during Gorbachev’s visit to China in 1989 and shook Deng’s hand.